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ABSTRACT 
This introduction aims to describe some fundamental problems of intergenerational justice and climate change. It 
also intends to provide comments on improved versions of some of the best papers presented in the International 
Meeting “Intergenerational Justice and Climate Change: juridical, moral and political issues” that took place at 
Cordoba National University (Argentina), in September 2017. In that meeting, the discussion focused on these 
topics by considering the ideas of the two keynote speakers invited to the event: Lukas H. Meyer and Alessandro 
Pinzani. I devote the last part of this essay to discuss two pressing issues concerning climate change whose practical 
solutions challenge our standard understanding of the notion of harm. 
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Introduction 
Since John Rawls’ writings and, more specifically, the work of Derek Parfit, the study 
of intergenerational issues has increased considerably. Intergenerational discussions focus on 
two sets of questions. On the one hand, the relationship between currently living people and 
past and future generations, and, on the other hand, it focuses on the relationships between 
currently living people in matters that have components that cannot be limited to the temporary 
space in which currently living people exist. Past generations include those subjects that no 
longer exist at present, while future generations include those who will exist after current living 
people die. In a nutshell, intergenerational justice tends to understand how people, whose 
lifetime do not overlap, should relate to each other.  
The study of the intergenerational question has gained practical relevance due to a series 
of problems, characteristic of the time in which we live, whose solution requires considering 
scenarios that either took place in the past or are likely to occur in the future. Climate change 
is one of the most critical problems that theories of intergenerational justice have to deal with. 
Climate change is a unique case because it involves, in the realm of climate justice discussions, 
both global and intergenerational concerns.  
http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2018v17n3p345 
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In the introduction to this special issue, firstly, I will highlight some of the most 
challenging problems that should be solved in the realm of intergenerational justice and climate 
change (section I). Secondly, I describe and provide comments on the papers included in this 
issue (section II). Finally, I will devote the last part of this essay to discuss two pressing issues 
whose practical solutions challenge our standard understanding of one of the most relevant 
moral concepts, that is, the notion of harm. I will discuss, on the one hand, the non-identity 
problem. This issue  challenges the concept of harm. On the other hand, I analyse the discussion 
concerning what kind of obligations we have when we talk about minimising the number of 
people who will suffer harm as a result of the adverse effects of climate change. This second 
problem challenges the normative significance of the notion of harm (section III).  
 
I. Intergenerational justice and climate change: some problems 
 
1. Intergenerational justice 
If we focus on our relationship with future people, there are at least four sources of 
doubts regarding the possibility of intergenerational justice (see Meyer 2015, 1-9). It has been 
denied (1) that future people will have claims towards presently living people since they do not 
have current existence (De George 1980, 159).  It also has been challenged (2) that we have 
obligations to future generations based on the present lack of available information regarding 
future people´s interests (Ost F. and v. Hoecke 1997, 697). Others have objected (3) that 
because future people cannot exercise power on us in order to enforce our obligations, we have 
no obligations vis-à-vis them. Between future people and us, there is no reciprocity (Gauthier 
1987, Ch. 9). Our motivation for being concerned with future people’s well-being has also been 
challenged (4). In this introduction, I cannot deal with all of these problems in detail. However, 
mainly by following Lukas H. Meyer’s writings, I would like to suggest some ways in which 
these issues might be addressed.  
Regarding (1), the objection is that because of future people do not exist now; they 
cannot be bearers of rights in the present. Robert Elliot provides two classical responses to this 
objection. On the one hand, the non-concessional view, which rejects that “there cannot be 
rights whose bearers do not yet exist” (Elliot 1989, 160). On the other hand, the concessional 
view, which concedes this point but rejects that the present inexistence of future people’s rights 
is a valid basis for rejecting that present living people have duties towards future people, 
provided that future people will exist (Elliot 1989, 161-162).  
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Concerning (2), that is, the problem of the so-called temporal myopia, the following 
could be stated. From the lack of knowledge about future generations’ interests, it does not 
follow the inexistence of obligations toward them. Instead, the consequence would be –more 
plausibly– the opposite. The current generation has, at least, the duty not to undermine the 
condition of life of future people in a way that it would be impossible for them to fulfil their 
interests, whatever those interests might be, to the extent that such interests will be reasonable. 
Regarding (3), that is, the lack of capacity of future generations to impose sanctions on 
the non-fulfilment of our obligations, it could be stated that such objection relies on a 
contentious theory about rights: the will theory. If instead of such theory, we adopt the interest 
theory of rights, to be able to exercise a right is neither necessary nor sufficient to be the bearer 
of a right. According to this theory, claiming that X has a right is asserting that “an aspect of 
X’s well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be under 
a duty” (Raz 1986, 166). If we assume, as Meyer has suggested,  that future people will have 
interests in the future which we can adversely affect by our actions in the present, it seems 
accurate to claim that  future people will be –in the future– bearers of rights to whom we are –
in the present– under correlative duties (2015, 11) 
Finally, regarding (4) our motivation to worry about future people, the problem arises 
since it seems that nothing they might do could benefit us. Therefore, we would not have 
reasons to want to fulfil our duties vis-a-vis them. However, it could be claimed that –at least 
with future people whose existence is not so distant in time– we share with them strongly future-
oriented projects. This fact makes us members of an intergenerational community that allows 
us to find common bases to be motivated in fulfilling our obligations regarding future 
generations (Meyer 2000, 646). According to Meyer, strongly future-oriented projects are those 
which transcend the time of living of some person. These projects would be meaningless if 
future people will not follow the pursuing of them (Meyer 1997, 141-142). For example, think 
of those projects of huge forestation that will be useful only in a future that is relatively far from 
now. Owed to the fact that fulfilling projects like this require some future people’s actions, it 
seems that we need to fulfil our obligations regarding them in order for our project to be fruitful. 
The fact that we need help from future people in order to fulfil such projects provide some 
source of motivation to fulfil our duties to future generations. 
 
2. Climate change justice 
Anthropogenic climate change is the consequence of the accumulation of greenhouse 
gases in the atmosphere. According to the 5° IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel Against Climate 
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Change) report, climate change will cause floods, heatwaves, food insecurity, droughts and 
epidemics transmitted by vectors and the water (IPCC, 2014). These changes will cause not 
only a worsening of people's conditions of life but also a large number of deaths (IPCC, 2018). 
These consequences are caused by changes in climate, mostly occasioned by historical 
emissions. These circumstances make climate change a unique case of historical injustices. 
Standard cases of historical injustices are those in which past generations of one community 
wronged past generations of other community, and current living members of both generations 
try to respond fairly to that historical fact. However, regarding climate change, “we are faced 
with the situation that earlier generations of one community directly affect something to the 
detriment of later generations of another community” (Meyer & Roser 2010, 230). Further, the 
present generation of both communities should take measures to solve the problem. These 
distinctive features of climate change force us to analyse how to achieve a fair distribution of 
the burden of combating anthropogenic climate change by taking into account not only global 
but also intergenerational dimensions (Kostald C. et al. 2014, 215-219; Meyer 2013, 603). 
Because many of the contributions to this special issue discuss this issue, here, I will only 
describe the general framework of how to analyse the “distribution problem”.  
The discussions here try to provide a normative framework according to which the 
global carbon budget of greenhouse gases might be justifiably distributed. In this realm, 
scholars discuss what, among which entities and how the distribution should be made. The 
discussion of what should be distributed is related to the right currency according to which the 
distribution of the carbon budget should be assessed. Scholars disagree if that currency has to 
be defined in terms of basic needs, welfare or capabilities. The discussion concerning which 
entities refers to who are the entities that should be considered as the appropriate providers of 
the burdens and benefits of climate justice obligations. Here, the discussion is between those 
who claim that individual (or legal) persons should be burdened and those who claim that States 
are the appropriate entity that should bear the burden.  
Finally, the discussion of how the distribution should be performed focuses on two 
separate issues. The first one tries to identify if the pattern of distribution should be specified 
according to egalitarian, prioritarian or sufficientarian concerns (see Meyer and Roser 2006, 
233-240). The second one rests on the possibility of allowing a deviation of such a baseline 
considering historical emissions of greenhouse gases. It has been objected that such a deviation 
in (whatever be) the right baseline of distribution is unjustified due to two factors associated 
with past emissions. First, many people who emitted greenhouse gases are dead. Thus, 
“currently living people should not be made responsible for the acts of their ancestors and 
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should not be put at a disadvantage simply because the people inhabiting their country before 
them emitted too much” (Meyer 2013, 604). The second objection states that “one can only be 
blamed for a certain act if one knows –or should know– of the harmful effects of the act” (Meyer 
2013, 604). Past polluters did not know nor could have known the harmful effects of their 
emissions. For that reason, it seems unjust to consider their activities as an injustice. Thus, a 
deviation of the fair pattern of distribution based on these facts seems unjust. Responding to 
these objections seem essential because, between 1870 and 2019, more than 76% of the carbon 
budget was used, leaving merely less than 24% of that global budget to be used.2 Further, 
“highly industrialised countries are causally responsible for more than three times as many 
emissions between 1850 and 2002 than developing countries” (Meyer 2013, 603), and now, a 
reduction in the level of emissions is required for avoiding a climate catastrophe in the future.  
 
II. Solving problems of intergenerational and climate justice 
At this point, I would like to describe briefly each of the papers that appear in this special 
issue. A fundamental intergenerational issue has not been highlighted yet. The problem refers 
to identifying those conditions according to which sovereigns debts are morally binding. In his 
contribution, Cristan Dimitriu argues that the fact that some sovereign debt generates poverty 
in the country in which the money has been lent is not necessarily relevant for assessing the 
justice or injustice of such a debt. The author describes and criticises Pogge’s account on the 
issue and, then, he proposes his own scheme trying to explain under which conditions a 
sovereign debt might be considered binding. 
Regarding his description of Pogge’s account, Dimitriu explains that, according to 
Pogge, the borrowing privilege can be unjust because of the effects on the population of the 
debtor. Dimitriu challenges that view by claiming that Pogge’s account is vulnerable to two 
objections. According to the first objection, Pogge’s account rests on counterfactual judgments 
in order to claim that if the borrowing privilege does not exist, then those countries who have 
received money would have been better off. According to Dimitriu, this reliance on 
counterfactual judgments is hard to explain. There are too many empirical claims that make 
Pogge’s position challenging to support. The second objection is that, even if it can be 
considered that those countries who use the borrowing privilege are worse-off than they would 
have been otherwise, this fact does not imply that they have been wronged.  
Due to these difficulties, Dimitriu proposes his own account. For him, sovereign debts 
are binding as long as two conditions are satisfied: first, the public official of some country does 
not overstep his authority. He calls this “the authorisation condition”.  Second, the lender should 
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be aware that the loan will be used for purposes that are not in conflict with human rights 
violations and they will not be used for the sake of the personal interests of the public officer. 
Dimitriu’s proposal seems promising; however, I have two worries here. 
Regarding the first condition, I am not sure if the violation of such condition is strong 
enough to make sovereign debts non-binding. It seems that, at best, such a violation generates 
moral and political responsibility of the public officer in question vis-à-vis its political 
community. About the second condition, I think, a distinction should be made. I do not think 
that the requirements that should limit international organisations like the IMF, IDB or the 
World Bank are necessarily the same requirements that should limit merely private lenders. It 
seems accurate to say that such a condition applies to the former, but it is not clear if and how 
it should be applied to the latter.  
In his contribution to this volume, Alex Richardson argues in favour of the capability 
approach. After describing Nussbaum’s famous account, the author argues, with Breena 
Holland, that a sustainable climate system is a necessary precondition for the protection of the 
future people’s capabilities. According to Richardson, the core capabilities depend on 
environmental factors. Hence, if we want to measure intergenerational justice in terms of 
capabilities, we should behave in a way that prevents environmental degradation such that the 
fulfilment of capabilities of future people will be impossible. For measuring what counts as 
harm in these kinds of cases, the author rests on the threshold notion. Richardson claims “Based 
on the argument that the capabilities on Nussbaum’s list must be enabled to some degree in 
order for us to live lives that are worthy of human dignity, we may define the threshold by 
referencing them”.  
My worry with Richardson’s proposal rests on the last statement. According to the 
author, the threshold of harm is defined by reference to capabilities. However, I think, he needs 
to provide a pattern of justice and not merely a currency for supporting the previous claim. It 
seems that he is relying on some egalitarian account. For example, he claims that this account 
“only requires that [future people] be sufficiently like us in terms of core capacities for various 
functioning that are uniquely human”. However, if this is the case, I am not sure if having an 
environment without degradation is a pre-condition of that. It seems that there are many 
possible satisfiers for fulfilling human capabilities, and not all of them are necessary based on 
the fact that the environment could, indeed, be degraded over time. 
The global market, in particular, the proposal according to which carbon markets can 
fulfil egalitarian goals is challenged in one of the contributions of this issue. Antoine Verret-
Hamelin highlights seven structural features of emission-trading schemes (ETS) that explain 
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why such a scheme necessarily reproduce pre-existing inequalities. This criticism assumes 
egalitarianism as the right pattern of intergenerational justice, and it applies the pattern to a 
specific way of dealing with the adverse effects of climate change. The author argues, “The 
wealthiest companies regulated by a carbon market will always have the power and the 
willingness to manipulate –at their advantage– the features of this particular market, so pre-
existing inequalities will be reproduced in a new sphere.” Verret-Hamelin’s main concern, I 
think, is the huge disproportionate power of the companies under ETS that allows them to 
manipulate the carbon market in favour of their private interests. After highlighting some 
additional moral problems related to carbon markets, the author concludes that other remedies 
that might be used aimed at minimising our emissions, for example, high taxes on luxury 
products that are carbon-intensive may be considered as a better solution. These taxes, 
according to him, are “less complex and less subjected to information asymmetries,” hence, I 
can add, less able to be manipulated by the wealthiest companies.  
Ushana Jayasuriya also criticises the emission-trading scheme (ETS). She focuses on 
non-ideal arguments. Non-ideal proposals build their arguments, as Jayasuriya reminds us, 
assuming that at least one of the following two conditions are not met: “1) All relevant agents 
comply with the demands of justice applying to them, and 2) natural and historical conditions 
are favourable”. The author criticises the ETS scheme after providing a survey of different 
possibilities for dealing with climate change. She claims, from a non-ideal point of view, that 
ETS “illustrates one of the largest flaws in the current approach to climate agreements”. She 
highlights that in addition to the imbalance of power between rich and emerging countries, the 
problem with ETS rests on the fact that if it is possible to buy emissions, some incentives for 
innovation are lost. Taking into account the previous considerations, the author concludes and 
supports the ability to pay approach because, according to her, it seems more effective and the 
most beneficial principle for distributing the obligations related to climate change. She thinks 
that climate agreements are likely to be more successful when they are considered from 
forward-looking perspectives rather than backwards-looking ones.  
The contribution of Reyes Espinoza is contentious and challenging. His main argument 
is the following: “If we desire protections for sentient ecosystems, (…) due to harmful 
anthropogenic climate change, then we need to take indigenous environmental interests (IEIs) 
seriously since engaging with these is one of the best strategies to mitigate harms from 
anthropogenic climate change to sentient ecosystem on planet Earth. (…) Therefore, we –
persons, groups, and procedural institutions– need to take IEIs seriously, that is, be moved to 
concrete action that stops harms to them”. As it is possible to see, this argument rests on very 
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contentious premises. In his paper, Reyes Espinoza defends them by claiming that engaging our 
sense of loyalty is essential in order to protect long-term human interests and long-term 
environments. He argues that civil society ought to use tribal social instincts in aiming for 
preventing or mitigating climate change. 
Finally, the contribution of Andrés Cruz argues, from the perspective of democratic 
theory, that institutional orders should take into account future people’s interests in their 
decisions (he also considers a case in favour of young children, severely cognitively disabled 
humans, sentient animals and even non-sentient forms of life). Cruz understands future people 
as democratic patients and argues that democratic patients, that is, non-agents whose interests 
can be affected by policies democratically decided, should be considered in the theory of 
democracy. Based on David Estlund’s work, he argues that failures in considering fairly the 
interests of democratic patients is a problem for democracy. After exploring the challenge at 
stake, he concludes with the idea that the consideration of democratic patients’ interests should 
not be pursued at the expense of those of the democratic agents. 
 
III. Harm, future people and climate change 
1. The non-identity problem and the concept of harm 
In the introduction of this paper, I stated that I would devote this last section to the 
discussion of two additional problems, with intergenerational and climate dimensions, that 
challenge the traditional understanding of the notion of harm. The first of these issues is the 
non-identity problem (Parfit 1984-7, Ch.16). This problem has been a significant ground of 
scepticism to the possibility of having justice-based duties towards future people because it 
challenges our usual conception of harming by claiming that, in some situations, our actions 
cannot harm future people.  
The most common way to explain why someone has been harmed appeals to the 
subjunctive-historical notion of harm. As Meyer highlighted, according to this notion of harm, 
“having acted in a certain way (or having refrained from acting in that way) at a time t1, we 
thereby harm someone only if we cause this person to be worse off at some later time t2 than 
this person would have been had we not interacted with this person at all” (2015, 13). This 
notion of harm can explain the majority of the cases in which we believe that a person has been 
harmed. However, as Derek Parfit has shown, regarding people who do not exist at the moment 
in which we act, we encounter a situation commonly overlooked: “as well as having effects on 
the quality of future people´s lives, our acts and policies may affect who it is who will later 
live” (Parfit 2011, 218). Let us analyse the following case brought by Parfit: 
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“As a society, we have to choose whether we will continue to deplete certain scarce 
unrenewable resources or continue to overheat the Earth’s atmosphere. If we choose Depleting 
or Overheating, these policies would raise the quality of life of existing people, but the long-
term effects more than a century from now would significantly lower the quality of future 
people´s lives” (2011, 218). 
In this case, at first glance, it might seem that the decision relies on choosing between 
harming future people and harming current living people. However, according to the 
subjunctive-historical notion of harm, this is not so. It is true that if we do not choose at t1 
Depleting or Overheating current living people will be at t2 worse off than these people would 
have been had the policy been chosen. However, it is not true that, if we choose at t1 Depleting 
or Overheating, the future people affected by our decision will be at t2 worse off than these 
people would have been had the policy not been chosen. If we do not choose Depleting or 
Overheating, it is not true that the future people affected by our decision will be better off. In 
such a case, that specific group of future people would not have existed at all.  
The question rests on the fact that depending on which action has been performed, the 
identity of the resulting person will be different. Hence, such actions cannot worsen the state in 
which the person affected will be in. Thus, it seems that we cannot claim that such actions are 
harmful, at least according to the subjunctive-historical notion of harm. 
For claiming that our choice of Depleting or Overheating will harm these future people, 
an identity-independent notion of harm is necessary (Meyer 2003, 147). The threshold notion 
of harm could provide a solution here. According to such a notion, “Having acted in a certain 
way (or having refrained from acting in that way) at time t1, we thereby harm someone only if 
we cause this person’s life to fall below some specified threshold” (Meyer 2015, 21). According 
to this notion, a person is suffering harm when this person is in a state that is below some 
normatively defined threshold. If, as a consequence of our choosing of Depleting or 
Overheating, future people will have a level of well-being that is below the threshold, we have 
harmed those future persons.  
However, the threshold notion of harm cannot explain why current living people can be 
considered harmed by our refraining from choosing the policy of Depleting or Overheating. 
Although in that case currently living people will be worse off than they would have been had 
the policy been chosen, they would not be below the normatively defined threshold. The 
problem, hence, is that it seems that whatever choice we take, some group of people will be 
harmed. However, neither the subjunctive-historical notion of harm nor the threshold notion of 
harm can explain, by themselves, why this is so.  
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Lukas Meyer has proposed, as a necessary condition of harming, the disjunction 
between harming actions that cause someone to be in a subthreshold state and harming actions 
that cause someone to be worse off than this person would have been. The disjunctive notion 
interprets as a necessary condition of harming “to the disjunction of the conditions for harming 
as set out by the notions of harm at [subjunctive-historical] and [threshold]” (Meyer 2015, 31). 
This disjunctive notion of harm allows us to explain, in the previous case, why future people 
can be considered harmed by choosing the policy Depleting or Overheating, and why current 
living people can be considered harmed by our refraining from adopting such a plan. Our 
choosing of Depleting or Overheating will cause future people to be below the threshold (from 
now on, harm in the threshold-based sense) and our refraining from choosing such a policy will 
cause current living people to be worse off than they would have been (from now on, harm in 
the subjunctive-historical-based sense).  
Although the previous disjunctive notion can explain the harm at stake in the scenario 
of Depleting or Overheating, to know which policy should be pursued, there must be some 
criterion to measure which of these two kinds of harm is worse. Is it worse to suffer harm in the 
subjunctive-historical sense, or is it worse to suffer harm in the threshold-based sense? This 
concern arose during the meeting we had at Cordoba National University (September 2017) 
that was the basis of the publication of this special issue. In that meeting, Lukas Meyer, in his 
presentation “Climate Justice in Time” proposed his disjunctive notion of harm. Against that 
view, Alessandro Pinzani, in his presentation entitled “Intergenerational Justice: towards a more 
political approach”, threw the following challenge. He stated that since Meyer’s position 
assumes that future people have rights “and since they may enter in conflict with equally 
legitimate claims of present people, we would come to an impasse, in which we do not know 
any longer how to solve the conflict”.  
Although I cannot solve the disagreement between the two keynote speakers of that 
meeting here, I will provide two considerations that could help to get out of this impasse. First, 
when someone is harmed in the threshold-based sense, the baseline of comparison (for claiming 
that this person is suffering harm) is given by a normatively defined threshold, that is, the state 
in which the person affected should have been. This kind of harm is intrinsic in the sense that 
its seriousness does not require people to be worse off than their alternatives (Parfit 2017b, 
133). Instead, when a person is suffering harm in the subjunctive-historical-based sense, the 
status of harm derives from the comparison between two possible states: the state in which the 
person affected is and the state in which the person would have been had the agent not interacted 
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with the person affected at all. This harm has essentially a comparative dimension in the sense 
that some alternative would have been better for the person affected (Parfit 2017b, 134). 
My second claim tends to understand how these two kinds of harm should be compared. 
To explain the method of comparison, firstly, it should be noticed that there are two ways in 
which the seriousness of harm could vary: quantitatively and qualitatively. Two persons suffer 
quantitatively different harm when, concerning a defined baseline, one of them is further from 
such a baseline than the other. Instead, two persons suffer qualitatively different harm if one of 
them is suffering harm in the threshold-based sense and the other in the subjunctive-historical-
based sense.  
To measure the seriousness of harm, quantitatively, it is helpful to introduce the notion 
of units of harm. Each unit of harm should be measured in comparison with a defined baseline. 
In this way, we will have, on the one hand, units of harm in the threshold-based sense and, on 
the other hand, units of harms in the counterfactual-based sense. Regarding harm in the 
threshold-based sense, the greater the distance between the state in which the person is and the 
threshold of harm, the greater the number of units of harm in the threshold-based sense will be. 
In the same way, regarding harm in the subjunctive-historical-based sense, the greater the 
distance between the state in which the person affected is and the counterfactual state in which 
this person would have been, the greater the number of units of harm in the subjunctive-
historical sense will be. Therefore, for knowing which kind of harm is worse we have to assess 
how much worse is suffering one unit of one kind of harm in comparison with one unit of harm 
of the other kind.  
Although the quantitative measurement of harm seems clear, the problems appear when 
we compare qualitatively different harms. Because harm in the subjunctive-historical-based 
sense is inherently comparative, and harm in the threshold-based-sense is essentially intrinsic, 
the comparison between them cannot be precise. There is no numerical form or rate capable of 
letting us claim how much worse or severe is one kind of harm concerning the other one. The 
way in which we have to compare these two kinds of harm is the same way in which we should 
compare two painful ordeals that differ both in length and intensity. Parfit (2016b) suggested 
that since the ordeals vary both in length and intensity, there are two standards to which each 
ordeal must be measured: intensity and length. When we analysed two ordeals and one of them 
is becoming worse in intensity and the other in length, each added unit of suffering adds not 
only seriousness or severity to the ordeal but also imprecision in the comparison. Therefore, 
although we can claim that one ordeal is worse or equal than the other, we cannot claim that 
they are so in a precise way.  
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When we try to compare the severity of qualitatively different harm, like the comparison 
between two ordeals which differ both in length and intensity, we have to measure the severity 
of harm in relation to two standards. We have to take into account the threshold of harm and 
the counterfactual life the person would have had if the state in which she is had not been 
obtained. Because of this fact, it is impossible to claim that the comparison is precise.  For 
example, imagine that we believe when we compare two different harms, that are quantitatively 
equal, that suffering harm in the threshold-based sense is worse than suffering harm in the 
subjunctive-historical-based sense. This claim is acceptable because if one person is suffering 
harm only the threshold-based sense and the other one only in the subjunctive-historical-based 
sense, whatever the level where the threshold of harm has been placed would be, the former 
will have a worse level of well-being than the latter. If we care about the situation of people 
who are badly-off, this fact supports the statement that suffering harm in the threshold-based 
sense is worse than suffering harm in the subjunctive-historical-based sense. However, we do 
not know yet how much worse one kind of harm is in relation to the harm of another kind.  
One possible method of making comparisons in cases of imprecision is Parfit’s 
Imprecise Lexical View (2016b, 112). In our field, it requires asserting that suffering harm in 
the threshold-based sense is lexically worse than suffering harm in a subjunctive-historical-
based sense, but in an imprecise way. The thesis is the following: although suffering more units 
of harm in the counterfactual-based sense makes the suffered harm worse, a sufficient number 
of units of harm in the threshold-based sense would always be worse than suffering any number 
of units of harm in the subjunctive-historical-based sense.3 This way of comparing harms allows 
us to decide how to behave justifiably in those cases in which some harm will be caused 
whatever the action to be performed would be. Hence, we might solve those conflicts between 
future people and current living people’s interests that were part of Pinzani’s concern. 
 
2. Saving people from climate threats?  
The second problem, relevant for intergenerational and climate discussions, does not 
challenge a specific conception of harm but the normative significance of such a notion. The 
problem arises when we try to identify what kind of obligation we have when we talk about 
minimising the number of people who will suffer harm or lose their lives as a result of the 
adverse effects of climate change (Parfit, 2016a). Two kinds of solutions have been proposed. 
The first one consists in claiming that currently living people have the positive duty of saving 
the greatest possible number of people from the adverse consequences of climate change. The 
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second one consists in asserting that the current generation has a negative duty not to cause 
harm to future people by refraining from contributing, with their emissions, to climate change.  
The problem with the first kind of solutions is that it relies on the fact that in order to 
save many people from the threats of climate change, we and the following generations would 
have to act and to design policies whose effects would also kill or harm some other smaller 
number of people (Parfit 2016a, 12). The issue is that it is commonly accepted –mainly within 
the non-consequentialist framework– that the negative duty not to cause harm is stronger than 
the positive duty of saving people lives (Ross 1939, 75). This statement was labelled as the 
conflict-of-duty harm principle (Parfit 2016a, 13).  
The problem with the second kind of solution that is, with the proposal of interpreting 
that the duty of currently living people relies on fulfilling the negative duty not to harm future 
people is that such a duty is only limited to refraining from making those emissions that may 
worsen the current climate problem (Shue 2015, 11). However, the climate in a non-distant 
future is –mainly– due to past emissions. Therefore, according to this second position, we could 
not avoid the deaths of many lives that, under the first view, we are permitted to save. 
In a nutshell, the first proposal allows saving a greater number of people from the 
adverse effects of climate change. However, it is against the conflict-of-duty harm principle. 
The second proposal, instead, is according to such a principle. However, it cannot provide a 
justificatory basis for saving as many lives as possible. Perhaps because the first type of position 
seems to avoid a higher number of harms, it is the case that there are several proposals for 
rejecting the conflict-of-duty harm principle or, at least, for limiting its scope.  
Views that reject such a principle are mainly related to some kind of act-
consequentialism. These people claim that the rightness or wrongness of our actions depends 
on the fact that their consequence would make things go best (Parfit 2011, 374). This view 
allows us to prevent the greatest number of harms caused by climate change. For this kind of 
account, there is no difference between harming someone and letting someone suffer harm 
(Rachels 1997, 78). That is, there is no priority of negative duties over positives duties. As we 
know, this kind of position not only does not fulfil the requirements of the conflict-of-duty harm 
principle but also they have unpalatable consequences in commonly discussed practical cases. 
For example, it may require that we mutilate a person in order to destine every one of its viable 
organs to a large number of people who, as a result, will be saved.  
Two ways have been proposed for limiting the scope of the conflict-of-duty harm 
principle, and, therefore, to avoid such counterintuitive conclusions implied in its pure 
rejection. The first one consists in asserting that while (a) it is wrong to kill a person as a means 
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to save a greater number of people, (b) it is permissible to save a larger number of persons by 
an action whose foreseeable side effect is that a smaller number of other people die (Foot 2002, 
25; Quinn 1989, 312; Kamm 1996, 272). The second way consists in appealing to the 
redirection principle (Thomson 1986, 84; McMahan 1993, 272).  
The defence of the first idea rests on the fact that, by killing or harming as a means to 
fulfil a specific aim, we are treating the affected persons in a way that could not possibly be 
agreed by these people, i.e. we are treating them not as ends in themselves. However, it might 
be asserted that “whether someone could possibly agree to be killed [or harmed] could not 
depend on whether this person would be killed as a means or as a foreseen side-effect” (Parfit 
2017a, 383). The defence to the second idea asserts that it is possible to redirect a threat that 
has not been provoked by the person if acting in that way will cause a smaller number of other 
people to be harmed. The problem with this second possibility, applied to the climate situation, 
is that in taking concrete measures for saving people from the adverse consequences of climate 
change, we would not be redirecting a previous threat but replacing it with a new one. The 
clearest case in which a new threat is introduced occurs when we think in using measures of 
climate engineering for responding to climate change.  
My proposed solution to the problem of identifying the kind of duty we have concerning 
future people in the climate scenario is framed within those positions that claim that the present 
generation has a negative duty not to harm future people. This view begins with the distinction, 
proposed by Parfit, between agent-relative duties and omnipersonal duties. Agent-relative 
duties are those according to which different people should try to achieve different goals; 
instead, omnipersonal duties are those according to which everyone has the same aim (Parfit 
2016b, 1). Under such a scheme, –with Parfit– the proposal consists of understanding the 
negative duty not to harm as an omnipersonal duty rather than an agent-relative duty. Thus, 
instead of claiming that each person has the negative duty not to harm or kill people, it has to 
be asserted that people have the negative “duty to act in a way whose outcome would be that 
the fewest people are killed or harmed” (Parfit 2017a, 407). Understanding such a duty in this 
way implies that we and our past generations are committed to ensuring that as few people as 
possible will be harmed or killed.  
By taking measures aimed to avoid the greatest possible number of harms or deaths, 
with the consequence that fewer people will be harmed, we would not be fulfilling a positive 
duty to save as many people as possible. In that case, if the duty not to harm is understood as 
omnipersonal (rather than agent-relative), our ancestors and we would be fulfilling the negative 
duty not to act in specific ways causing that the fewest people would be harmed or killed as a 
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result of the anthropogenic climate change. Therefore, pursuing policies or taking measures 
whose possible effects would be that many people in the future would not suffer harm would 
be instantiations not of a duty of saving people but of the no-harm principle.  
This way of understanding the duty not to harm has several advantages. Firstly, like 
consequentialists, it allows us to adopt the necessary measures to ensure that as many people as 
possible do not suffer the adverse consequences of climate change. Secondly, we could do that 
without appealing to the positive duty of saving as many lives as possible. Thus, we would not 
be violating the conflict-of-duty harm principle, supported mainly for non-consequentialists 
theorists. The proposal, then, could not only make it possible to take measures aiming to prevent 
the greatest number of people from suffering harm and deaths as a consequence of climate 
change in a justified way but also it allows doing so under a spectrum of broad theoretical 
consensus.4  
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